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Abstract. We characterize the unique equilibrium in which high ability sellers always
announce the quality of their items truthfully, in a repeated game model of experienced
good markets with adverse selection on a seller's propensity to supply good quality items.
In this equilibrium a seller's value function strictly increases in reputation and a seller's
type is revealed within nite time. The analysis highlights a new reputation mechanism
based on an endogenous complementarity the market places between a seller's honesty in
pre-trade communication (trust) and his/her ability to deliver good quality (reputation).
As maintaining honesty is less costly for high ability sellers who anticipate less \bad news"
to disclose, they can signal their ability by communicating in a more trustworthy manner.
Applying this model, we examine the extent to which consumer feedback systems foster
trust in online markets, including the possibility that sellers may change identities or exit.
(JEL Codes: C73, D82, D83, L14)
Keywords: cheap talk, consumer rating system, reputation, trust.
1 Introduction
This paper characterizes the unique equilibrium in which high ability sellers always an-
nounce the quality of their items truthfully, in a repeated game model of experienced good
markets with adverse selection on a seller's propensity to supply good quality items. In
this equilibrium a seller's value function strictly increases in reputation and a seller's type
is revealed within nite time. Applying this model, the paper examines the extent to which
consumer feedback systems may foster trust in online markets, rst when sellers cannot
change identities or exit, and then when they can.
In online markets buyers cannot physically inspect the items for sale but only rely on
the descriptions provided by the sellers regarding the quality of both the item itself and
the delivery service. Since payment will already have been made when the buyer learns
the quality (upon delivery), eective functioning of online markets hinges critically on
the existence of a mechanism that warrants a sucient level of trust amongst traders in
The research is supported by the Leverhulme Trust, and was initiated while B. Jullien was visiting
the University of Bristol. The authors thank Heski Bar-Isaac, Luis Cabral, Yuk-Fai Fong, David Levine,
Thomas Mariotti, J erome Mathis, Andrew McLennan, Fabien Postel-Vinay, Ron Siegel, Joel Sobel, Peter
Sorensen, and Mike Whinston for useful discussion and comments, as well as seminar participants at Oxford
University, the University Carlos III, and the Universities of Melbourne and Naples, and the CSIO/IDEI
Workshop in Toulouse School of Economics. Emails: bjullien@cict.fr and i.park@bristol.ac.uk.
1an ocean of strangers. Perhaps the most notable reaction of the market is the feedback
systems widely adopted by online platforms, such as eBay, that allow buyers and sellers
to leave publicly available comments about their trading partners.
Traditionally, word-of-mouth reputation systems have played an important role in ex-
perience good markets when legal systems of contract enforcement were absent or did not
work eectively. What is attempted via feedback systems amounts to engineering this
old wisdom in a new environment with certain special issues.1 In a recent survey paper,
Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) convey that existing empirical studies appear to point to the
existence of a correlation between the \feedback score" of an online seller and the average
quality delivered by that seller,2 yet the primary causes for the observed correlation remain
inconclusive.
This paper highlights a new reputation mechanism based on an endogenous comple-
mentarity the market places between a seller's honesty in pre-trade communication (trust)
and his/her ability to deliver high quality goods (reputation). Reputation may be fostered
because high ability sellers can better aord honest communication as they have less \bad
news" to disclose, enhancing short-term communication (on the sale item's quality); At
the same time, disparity in honesty across sellers of dierent ability accelerates long-term
learning process (on the seller's true ability), allowing quicker reputation building. The
reputational eect in our model is obtained via exploiting these reciprocal reinforcements
between trust in communication and reputation in ability, which is a novel mechanism as
far as we are aware. While this reputation mechanism has a particular pertinence to the
role of online feedback systems mentioned above, the principal insight applies to experience
good markets more generally.
Our approach stems from the recognition that there is a clear, albeit subtle, distinction
between the information that is to be captured by the feedback scores of a seller, and that
which is reected in the prices that he fetches: The former is the level of \trust" the market
places on the soft information provided by the seller prior to transaction concerning the
quality, suitability, etc., of the particular item for trade; whereas the latter reects the
market's expectation of the quality of items delivered by him. Thus, the role of feedback
systems is \to promote honest trade rather than to distinguish sellers who sell high quality
products from those that sell low quality products" as pointed out by Dellarocas (2006).
Therefore, the observed correlation between the market's trust in a seller's honesty
(feedback score) and its belief on his ability to deliver quality (price) is an indirect link
that is yet to be accounted for. This paper presents a theoretical study that maps out the
endogenous link between these two separate dimensions of \reputation," which we believe
exists in marketplaces more broadly, beyond online markets.
1See Dellarocas (2003 and 2006) and references therein for a discussion of reputation issues on Internet,
and Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) for a survey of the literature on seller reputation.
2According to Bajari and Hortacsu (2004), a presence of 5-12% price premium for an \established"
seller (with hundreds or thousands of mostly positively feedback scores) relative to a seller with no track
record appears to be the most robust ndings reported, e.g., by Melnik and Alm (2002), Livingston (2002),
Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001), and Resnick et al. (2003). This positive eect of seller reputation on price
is conrmed when more detailed data are used, by Houser and Wooders (2006) who control heterogeneous
item descriptions and by Canals-Cerda (2008) who analyze panel (as opposed to cross-sectional) data.
2Specically, we study non-binding, pre-trade communication in buyer-seller relation-
ships on a platform that maintains a full record of transaction history. First, we analyze
a baseline case in which sellers have no place to trade other than a platform that can
perfectly monitor sellers' identities and thus, prevent their history from being erased. We
then extend the model to a full dynamic set-up in which sellers may restart with a clean
record by obtaining a new identity, or may exit the platform for an outside option.
In our baseline model, a seller randomly draws an item of either good or bad quality
in each period and announces this quality as cheap talk. Each seller is of one of two
private types, high or low ability: a high-type seller draws a good quality item more
frequently. Each item is traded at a price that is equal to the expected quality based
on the market's belief regarding the seller's true ability, termed his \reputation," and his
announcement. The buyer learns the true quality and reports it publicly, revealing the
truthfulness of the seller's announcement (feedback system). The seller's reputation level
is then updated accordingly. Here, we postulate fully reliable feedback comments because
we are interested in the extent to which feedback mechanisms may help elicit trustworthy
pre-trade communication from sellers.
As sellers' announcements are cheap talk, there always exists a \babbling" equilibrium
in which announcements by sellers are completely ignored and thus, play no role at all. In
this equilibrium, feedback comments induce only \pure learning" through simple observa-
tion of past quality, with no strategic eect on eliciting honest pre-trade communication.
As the polar benchmark, we focus on equilibria in which high-type sellers always an-
nounce truthfully, and we establish that there is a unique equilibrium of this kind, which
we refer to as the \honest equilibrium".3 In this equilibrium, each and every truthful
announcement increases the seller's reputation, raising the price he receives in the next
period if he claims his item to be of good quality. Low-type sellers falsely claim bad quality
items to be good with a positive probability for short-term gain. A key intuition behind
this result is that following a truthful announcement strategy is more costly for low-type
sellers because they anticipate more \bad news" that they will have to disclose honestly.
The probability of a low-type seller lying is a continuous but non-monotonic function of
the prevailing reputation level, reaching one above a certain threshold reputation level.
Thus, communication facilitates information transmission in two separate dimensions.
Firstly, it allows credible transmission of information about the item's quality, so that
the price reects the true quality of the good more accurately. Secondly, it speeds up
the acquisition of information about the seller's type, because the truthfulness of the
announcement, in addition to the delivered quality, reveals information on the seller's
ability. Consequently, buyers learn the seller's ability more quickly, and more information
is incorporated in the price of the item.
We also show that low-type sellers lie less frequently at all levels of reputation as they
become more patient. This exerts diverging eects, however, on the two dimensions of
information transmission. It clearly strengthens the informational contents of announce-
ments on the item's quality, enhancing the credibility of the announcements and thereby,
their impact on prices; but it reduces the informational content on the seller's type, atten-
3We adopt this terminology from Sobel (1985) described below.
3uating the speed with which the market learns the seller's ability.
Then, we turn to the case in which sellers may start afresh at any time by obtaining a
new identity after \milking" his reputation (in the same or another marketplace), which
is a well-known problem with feedback systems.4 To examine the extent to which such a
possibility may undermine online reputation mechanisms, we extend the model to allow for
entry and exit of sellers. We characterize a stationary equilibrium when sellers may at any
time opt for an outside option of a xed value, as well as when they can freely restart with a
clean record in the same platform. We establish that in both cases a stationary equilibrium
exists that exhibits all the aforementioned features of the honest equilibrium. However, we
also show that reputation eects are weakened: Allowing such options increases cheating
incentives by limiting the damage from abusing reputation and as a result, low-type sellers
lie more frequently across all reputation levels than when such options were absent. As a
consequence of reduced condence, the price for good quality items is lower, but high-type
sellers are able to build reputation at a faster speed since honest announcements of bad
quality are received more favorably.
Allowing for entry and exit also brings extra insights as these decisions may convey
some information about the type of the seller. For instance, Bar-Isaac (2003) presents
a model similar to ours but with no scope for pre-trade communication (because sellers
don't observe the quality), in which the seller's decision to continue to trade is a signal that
enhances the seller's reputation. In our model with an outside option, entry decisions may
carry information on seller's type because some low-type sellers may opt for the outside
option rather than enter the platform.5 In such cases, existence of an outside option
instigates partial screening, lending new-comers to the platform the benet of a higher
initial reputation compared with the case without such an option. By contrast, if restarts
are allowed in the same platform, genuine new starters inevitably suer from a lower initial
reputation inicted by restarters who \contaminate" the pool of new-comers.
To highlight the core forces underlying the reputation mechanism delineated above, it
is useful to reiterate the two ways in which a feedback system can facilitate information
transmission. One is pure learning on the seller's true ability from observation of real-
ized qualities. The other is endogenous intertemporal complementarity between a seller's
honesty in pre-trade communication and the evolution of the market belief regarding his
ability to deliver quality. This complementarity induces high-ability sellers to adopt a
more trustworthy communication strategy, because they anticipate less bad news to dis-
close, and therefore nd such a strategy to be less costly. It is via this second eect that
feedback systems foster trust and credibility in pre-trade communication.
Observe that this second eect is possible because, in updating the market belief on
sellers' ability, feedback comments are used relative to the truthfulness of sellers' announce-
ments. Thus, our analysis suggests that there may be benets in designing feedback sys-
4Potential ways to make restarting with a clean record more dicult and costly have been discussed
by some authors, such as Friedman and Resnick (2001), who term the issue as \cheap pseudonyms," and
Dellarocas (2006). It has not been shown hitherto, however, how damaging cheap pseudonyms may be to
the functioning of feedback systems.
5Similar eects are present in Atkeson, Hellwig and Ordonez (2010) in a moral hazard context.
4tems in a way that informs buyers about the verity of pre-trade announcements, as well
as realized quality in past transactions.
Note that pre-trade communication would be useless without the feedback system due
to the inherent conict of interests between sellers and buyers. This proclaims a key char-
acteristic of our model, namely, that pre-trade announcements cannot carry information
on the item's quality unless they also carry information on the seller's ability. This im-
plies that no pre-trade communication may arise if the seller's ability is known. It is also
worth noting that adverse selection on an arbitrarily small dierence in ability is enough
to actuate credible communication via the reputation mechanism for suciently patient
sellers.
To focus on the endogenous complementarity between trust and reputation that drives
our mechanism, we adopt an adverse selection model in seller's ability. A side eect
of this modeling choice is that communication adds no social value so long as all items
are traded, precluding formal discussions of social welfare. However, we stress that our
mechanism extends straightforwardly to a moral hazard setting where sellers dier in their
cost of exerting eort that enhances the average quality of their items. As explained in the
conclusion, our results in this setting indicate that pre-trade communication can motivate
the more ecient sellers to exert high eort and thereby, enhance the social welfare.
This nding complements Mailath and Samuelson (2001) who show, inter alia, that for
reputation eects to arise in a similar model but without communication, the seller's type
needs to be subject to continual random changes.
At a theoretical level, the current paper builds on the reputation literature initiated
by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and further developed
by Diamond (1989), Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), Ely
and Valimaki (2003), and Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004), among others.6 In this
literature, one type of agent is committed to a certain behavior and another, strategic type
of agent either mimics this behavior so as to be pooled with the committed type (pooling
motive), or diverts from it so as not to be mistaken for the committed type (separating
motive). We do not assume a committed type in our model, yet both of the motives arise
endogenously, the pooling (separating) motive for sellers of low (high) ability type.
Our paper contributes specically to the literature on cheap-talk reputation which, due
to the nature of the issue, often concerns experts, advisors and certiers. Sobel (1985)
shows that an \enemy" (an informed agent who has a completely opposing preference
to the decision maker) may build a reputation by mimicking the honest reporting of a
\friend" (who has a perfectly aligned preference with the decision maker), while Morris
(2001) shows that even a friend may have a reputational incentive to lie. Ottaviani and
Sorensen (2001, 2006) study reputational cheap talk in a dierent model where experts
are motivated by exogenous career concerns.7 Benabou and Laroque (1992) study the
reputation of nancial experts, while Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009) examine the
6Mailath and Samuelson (2006) provide an extensive review of this literature.
7Although the mechanism diers for experts, they also nd that often adverse selection on experts'
quality enhances meaningful communication.
5extent to which reputation concerns discipline rating agencies.8
Our model is akin to Sobel (1985) and Morris (2001) in that the model does not assume
an inherently honest type. In contrast to these papers, however, a \friendly" seller cannot
exist in our model because sellers have the same monotonic preferences over prices. As
a consequence, knowing the seller's type would prevent any communication by even the
high-type seller in our context, whilst it would trivially solve the problem for the friendly
type in theirs. In this respect, our contribution diers substantially from theirs. Finally,
the current paper also makes a methodological innovation in establishing the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium when Blackwell's condition for a contraction mapping does not
apply.
The next section describes the baseline model and denes equilibrium. Section 3 presents
some preliminary results. Section 4 analyzes the reputation mechanism and characterizes
the unique honest equilibrium outcome. Section 5 analyzes an extended model in which
sellers may freely opt out or restart with a new identity. Section 6 discusses some further
extensions and concludes. The Appendix contains technical details.
2 Model
We consider a marketplace (or website) on which sellers interact with a large set of buyers
in innite periods t = 1;2;. Initially, we focus on a single cohort of sellers all entering
the marketplace at date t = 1 and staying there forever. This baseline model is analyzed
until Section 4. Then, in Section 5 we introduce options for sellers to opt out for a xed
exit value or to freely restart with a clean record.
Each seller is either of a high-ability type ( = h) or a low-ability type ( = `) where
0 < ` < h < 1. Each seller's type is private information and xed across periods. His
perceived ability in each period t is captured by his reputation t 2 [0;1], the common
belief that prospective buyers attach to him being of a high type ( = h) in that period.
In each period t, a seller with reputation t draws one item for sale of a random
quality qt which is good (g) with probability  and bad (b) with probability 1    where
 2 fh;`g is his type. Observing the quality of the item, the seller publicly makes a cheap
talk announcement mt 2 fG;Bg about its quality, where mt = G (B) is interpreted as
announcing the quality to be g (b). We say that the agent tells the truth if he announces
G when qt = g or B when qt = b, and lies otherwise.9
Modelling a seller as above is in line with, for instance, online markets for collectibles
and used goods, such as in eBay or Amazon, where the same seller repeatedly sells similar
items of varying quality, often referred to as the \state" of the item; Websites such as
Amazon.com and PriceMinister.com specically require the sellers to choose within a set
8These papers use the adverse selection approach to reputation. Papers (on cheap-talk reputation) also
exist that use the so-called \bootstrap" approach based on the folk theorem argument, e.g., Park (2005)
on cheap talk reputation of dierentiated experts and McLennan and Park (2007) on auditor reputation.
9Alternatively, we may model that each seller posts a price p at which buyers either buy or not, and
the purchaser of the item reports whether satised (q  p) or not (q < p). Our equilibrium continues to
be an equilibrium in this alternative model.
6of pre-codied levels (new, like new, good, fair, etc.) to describe the state of their items.10
The quality of an item captures buyers' willingness to pay, which we normalize as g = 1
and b = 0. The prospective buyers are myopic and try to maximize the expected quality
minus the price paid. We assume a competitive demand side so that each item is traded
at a price that is equal to the expected quality.11 In particular, sellers are not competing
either because their goods are non-rival or because there are more buyers than sellers.
(For instance, sellers run an auction amongst multiple buyers with the same valuation for
the good and common beliefs.) At the end of each period, the purchaser observes the true
quality qt and honestly reports it publicly.12 The seller's reputation is revised from t to
t+1 based on mt and qt, and the period t+1 starts. The seller's objective is to maximize
the discounted sum of its revenue stream with discount factor  2 (0;1). In each period
t, the full history of messages and items' quality delivered by the seller is publicly known.
The structure of this game, denoted by  , is common knowledge.
Our equilibrium concept is Markov perfect equilibrium with state variable t. Thus,
seller's equilibrium strategy species the probability that a seller \lies" as a function of
his type ; the reputation level , and the quality q of the item drawn.
Given a seller's strategy, a \price prole" p
m() is dened as the posterior probability
that an item is of good quality (q = 1) when announced m 2 fG;Bg by a seller with
reputation . Being the expected quality, p
m() is also the price at which the item will be
traded.
A \transition rule" is a function 
mq() that species the posterior probability that a
seller is of a high type ( = h) in the next period, when in the current period his reputation
is  and he sells an item of quality q after announcing m.
In (Markov perfect) equilibrium, the seller's strategy is optimal given the price prole
and the transition rule, where the price prole and the transition rule are obtained by
Bayes rule from the seller's strategy whenever possible.
Before turning to the characterization of the equilibria with adverse selection and cheap-
talk communication, we discuss a few properties of our model.
3 Preliminary considerations
The term \reputation" in the economic literature encompasses several notions, two of
which are present in our model. Firstly, reputation may refer to the beliefs concerning the
average quality provided by the seller to the market. In our model this corresponds to the
beliefs t on the seller's type . Secondly, reputation may refer to the level of condence
that consumers have on the truthfulness of the description of the good by a seller prior to
sale. This notion thus refers more to trust than to beliefs on the type. As is shown below,
however, these two concepts are intrinsically linked.
10Reputation eects in eBay have been empirically analyzed by, among others, Jin and Kato (2006) and
Cabral and Hortacsu (2008).
11This is in line with Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Bar-Isaac (2003).
12We assumed that the quality, although observable by the buyer, cannot be veried ex-post, so that
no warranty contract is feasible.
7We use the term \pure learning" to refer to the fact that mere observation of the
history of quality qt helps consumers improve their knowledge on the seller's type, in a
non-strategic manner.
3.1 The pure learning outcome
Suppose that there is no communication, say because the seller doesn't observe the quality
of the good. Then, in every period a seller's item is traded for a price that is equal to its
expected quality
pt = E(qjt) = th + (1   t)`
given his reputation t, which evolves according to a simple Bayes rule based on the
feedback report. The price and reputation follow a martingale, so they increase or decline
depending on whether the quality delivered last period was good or bad.
This pure learning outcome is the equilibrium outcome of the so-called \babbling equi-
librium" of the game   described in Section 2, which obtains for instance when the seller
always announces G and thus, the message mt, containing no informational content, is
ignored. The price and reputation evolve as described above and since announcement
doesn't aect the continuation game, it is trivially optimal for the seller to announce G:
3.2 The case of a single type
Next, suppose that there is a single possible type .13 Due to risk-neutrality and certainty
to trade, our model has the feature that in this case transmitting information to the buyer
brings no future benet to the seller. The reason is that since the price in period t will be
the expected quality conditional on the information available then, the ex-ante expected
price is  in all future periods, and consequently, the seller's continuation payo from the
next period must be =(1   ) regardless of what he does now.
This implies that repeated interaction cannot elicit any information transmission through
communication. To see this, suppose to the contrary that the message is informative in
some period, which means that the probability of announcing G when q = b is dierent
from the probability of doing so when q = g in that period. Thus, the prices would dier
for the two messages. But, since the continuation payo from the next period is =(1   )
independently of the message to be sent as veried above, the seller would announce with
certainty the message that would fetch the highest price, irrespective of q, contradicting
the supposition above that he would announce dierently contingent on q.
Thus, when the type of the seller is common knowledge, there is no scope of meaningful
communication in equilibrium.
13This diers from a situation that the buyers' beliefs assign probability 1 to  because, as we shall see
below, such a belief can be revised in o-equilibrium contingencies.
83.3 On communication in equilibrium
We say that an equilibrium involves communication if there is a positive probability that
in some period the message conveys some information. In our model, there are two types
of information that can be transmitted: information about the quality of the current item,
q, and information about the seller's type  2 fh;`g.
In our set-up, the seller's message conveys information about q in some period with
prevailing reputation level t, if the two messages, G and B, generate dierent posterior
beliefs on q by Bayes rule. This is the case if both messages are sent with positive prob-
ability and p
G(t) 6= p
B(t) in equilibrium. Similarly, messages convey information about
 if the Bayesian updating of the seller's reputation will depend on the message to be sent
by the seller as well as on the quality of the item to be reported.
We asserted above that communication about the quality of the item is not possible if
there is a single type. This observation extends to the following property when there are
multiple types, i.e., in a setting of adverse selection:
Property 1: Messages cannot convey information on the quality of the good unless they
convey information on the type of the seller.
To see this, suppose that no information on  is transmitted by messages in equilibrium.
Then, a seller's reputation will be updated as a function only of the history of delivered
quality as explained above and consequently, in any period t the expected future payo of
the seller is independent of the current message to be sent. If p
G(t) 6= p
B(t), therefore,
both types of seller must send the same message (the one that fetches a higher price) with
probability 1 regardless of q, establishing that the messages be uninformative on q.
Therefore, adverse selection and signalling about the type are necessary ingredients for
messages to be a credible signal of quality in our environment.
4 Honest Equilibrium
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium with communication. Given seller's strategy
and the associated price prole p
m and transition rule 
mq, we dene the value function
V 
 () : [0;1] ! R, as the expected discounted sum of the revenue stream of a seller of
type  and reputation . As we wish to study the extent to which reputation motives help
to induce truthful revelation of the quality of the product, we focus on equilibria with the
following property:
Condition H: An h-type seller always tells the truth regardless of q for all  > 0.
We refer to an equilibrium satisfying the condition H as an \honest equilibrium,"
although we will also use \equilibrium" without qualication when there is no ambiguity.
As some results are rather technical, we derive them formally in Appendix and present
them below in a more heuristic manner.
First, observe that it is impossible for an `-type seller to be always truthful in equilib-
rium, because then the price reects quality perfectly and each seller gets exactly for what
9he delivers, so an `-type seller has nothing to lose by cheating. To see this note that, since
the unconditional expected price at any date is at least ` (because the expected quality
in the market is equal to some weighted average of h and `), the continuation value is at
least `=(1 ) for any level of reputation . But this lower bound, `=(1 ), would be the
equilibrium payo of an `-type seller if he were to always tell the truth, because then in
each period he would get an equilibrium price p
G = 1 with probability ` and p
B = 0 with
probability 1   `. Thus, an `-type seller would lie and announce G upon drawing a bad
quality item.
However, there should be no incentive to misreport good quality as bad, since this
would reduce the current price without enhancing next period's reputation. Indeed, an
`-type seller is truthful whenever q = g as we verify in Appendix (Lemma 3). Thus, given
Condition H, we characterize the equilibrium strategy by the probability, denoted y();
that an `-type seller lies when q = b and his reputation is .14 Moreover, y() > 0 for all
 in any honest equilibrium as we outline below (and formally prove in Appendix). Thus,
the price prole p
m and the transition rule 
mq are determined as explained below.
For  2 [0;1], the expected quality of an item claimed as good (m = G) by a seller
with reputation  is
pG(;y) :=
h + (1   )`
h + (1   )(` + (1   `)y)
; (1)







B() = 0: (2)
For y > 0 and  < 1, pG(;y) is strictly increasing in  and strictly decreasing in y. Thus,
the more an `-type seller lies, the lower is the short-term gain from lying.
Next, we explain the transition rule 
mq(). Let us dene
Bb(;y) :=
(1   h)
(1   h) + (1   )(1   `)(1   y)
: (3)










whenever they are well-dened. Since Bb is strictly increasing in  < 1 and y < 1, the
more an `-type seller lies, the higher is the gain in reputation from telling the truth.
In cases of falsely claiming good quality, we have 
Gb() = 0 by Bayes rule as long as
 < 1. Note that 
Gb(1) is undened by Bayes rule, but it needs to be suciently low for
an h-type seller with  = 1 to not lie upon drawing q = b as per the condition H. Without
loss of generality, we take the convention that 
Gb(1) = 0 because it ensures continuity
of equilibrium variables V 
 and 
Gb at  = 1, without aecting the characterization
of equilibrium outcome (Cf. Lemma 4 in Appendix). This means that in any honest
14In light of Condition H, we will also specify later the probability that an h-type seller lies when  = 0
and q = b, but this is o-equilibrium and thus, is inconsequential.
10equilibrium, a substantial, if not as drastic, drop in reputation needs to be postulated in
the o-equilibrium contingency that a seller with reputation  = 1 lies. One interpretation
is that buyers, having classied the seller as h-type with certainty based on past records,
would reconsider their interpretation of the records upon (hypothetical) arrival of new
evidence inconsistent with this classication.
Lastly, 
Bg() is undened since a good quality item is never claimed to be bad, but
setting 





Bg() = 0 for all  2 [0;1]: (5)
4.1 Announcement strategy and value function of `-type
We start with an `-type seller with extreme reputation levels. Once a seller's reputation
falls to  = 0, he cannot increase his reputation above 0, because Bayes rule dictates
that 
mq(0) = 0 for any message m 2 fG;Bg that is sent with a positive probability.
Therefore, a seller with reputation 0 announces the message that gives the highest price
regardless of q, which implies that the seller gets the same equilibrium price, `, regardless
of q. This is the case when an `-type seller's announcement strategy is independent of q
when  = 0. Since labeling of messages is inconsequential due to the costless nature of
cheap talk messages, we make the convention that an `-type seller announces G regardless
of q when  = 0, i.e., y(0) = 1. This conrms that p
G(0) = `  p
B(0): An immediate
consequence is that the equilibrium value at  = 0 is V 
` (0) = `=(1   ).
Consider an `-type seller with the other extreme reputation  = 1. In this case, he
should lie with probability one upon drawing q = b, i.e., y(1) = 1, because otherwise
his value would be V 
` (1) = ` + V 
` (1) since p
G(1) = 1 and thus, V 
` (1) = `=(1   ) =
V 
` (0), contradicting the hypothesis that he lies with probability less than one. Note
that this conclusion relies on `=(1   ) being the lower bound of continuation payo as
asserted earlier and thus, is valid regardless of the reputation level that lying would take
to, 
Gb(1). Given 
Gb(1) = 0 as postulated earlier without loss of generality, we have
V 
` (1) = 1 + 
 
`V 






` (1) = V





As asserted above, an honest equilibrium is characterized by a function y(), specifying
the probability of an `-type seller lying when q = b, that is optimal relative to the associated
price prole p
m, transition rule 
mq, and the value function V 
` where, given (2),
V










Gg()) + (1   `)[y
()V



















11Note that V 
` determines y by (8), which in turn determines V 
` by (7). Thus, V 
` is a
xed point of a mapping dened by (7) and (8) as explained below, which we denoted by
T. The following lemma is useful in this discussion.
Lemma 1 In any honest equilibrium, V 
` is continuous and strictly increasing in  2 [0;1].
Proof. See Appendix (within Proof of Proposition 1).
In light of Lemma 1, we could dene T for all continuous and increasing functions
V : [0;1] ! R such that V (0) = `=(1   ) and V (1) = `=(1   )+. However, this is not
very useful because the operator T turns out to fail the Blackwell's suciency condition
for a contraction, which is a standard way of obtaining a unique solution in the literature.
Thus, we dene T for a domain F of all non-decreasing and right-continuous functions V
on [0;1] with V (0) = `=(1   ) and V (1) = `=(1   )+, which is compact (under weak
topology) so that a suitable Fixed-Point Theorem may be applied.
We now explain how to dene the mapping T. Observe that pG(;y) is continuous
and strictly decreasing in y (except when  = 1) and V (Bb(;y)) increases in y. For
any continuous function V 2 F, therefore, there is a unique function yV : [0;1] ! [0;1],





0 if pG(;0) < (V (Bb(;0))   V (0))
1 if pG(;1) > (V (Bb(;1))   V (0)) = 
y s.t. pG(;y) = (V (Bb(;y))   V (0)); otherwise:
(9)
We extend the pseudo-best-response to discontinuous functions V 2 F in Appendix.
The term on the RHS of the (in)equalities in (9) is the gain from enhanced reputation
that accrues to a seller who truthfully announces bad quality, which is bounded by .
Hence, yV() is optimal for `-type seller relative to V , pG(;yV()) and Bb(;yV()).
Since pG(;0) = 1 > , it must be the case that yV() > 0 for all  (as asserted earlier).
From pG(1;1) = 1 > , it further follows that yV() = 1 for all  >   where
  := inf f 2 [0;1] j pG(;1) > g < 1: (10)
Note that the threshold   may be zero, in which case an `-type seller lies whenever q = b.
Since yV()>0 for all , i.e., it is optimal for an `-type seller to lie whenever q = b, we
now dene a mapping T : F ! F by




Gg()) + (1   `)V (0)

: (11)
The equilibrium value function V 
` is a xed point of the operator T and the equilibrium
strategy is y() = yV 
` (), which is characterized below.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique xed point V 
` of T: The value function V 
` is con-
tinuous and strictly increasing on [0;1]; and the strategy y = yV 
` is continuous on [0;1].
12For smooth ow of discussion, we relegate a detailed proof to Appendix. Basically, the
existence follows from continuity of the operator T and the Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point
Theorem. Uniqueness is obtained separately from existence by using the properties of the
xed point. It stems from the observation that V 
` () is uniquely determined for  >  ,
from which the values for lower  are uniquely traced back recursively via (11).
Thus, our result is distinguished from that of Benabou-Laroque (1992) who obtain
existence and uniqueness by applying Blackwell's Theorem.15 In our model T is not
non-decreasing in V and hence, Blackwell's condition for a contraction is not applicable.
Mathis, McAndrew and Rochet (2009) exploit an idea akin to ours in obtaining a construc-
tive proof of existence in a model of rating agencies. Their proof relies on the fact that
only positive claims generate trade and thus can be veried, which simplies the analysis
greatly.
4.2 Optimality for h-type sellers and equilibrium
To verify equilibrium conditions fully, it remains to show that it is indeed optimal for
an h-type seller to announce truthfully, given the strategy y, price prole p
m, and the
transition rule 
mq identied in the previous section. Recall V 
h denotes the value function
of an h-type seller.
Note that 
Bb(0) is undened by Bayes rule. We proceed presuming that 
Bb(0) = 0,
which ensures incentive compatibility at  = 0 and thus, incurs no loss of generality in
characterizing the equilibrium outcomes (as elaborated in Appendix). Then, it is clear













An h-type seller, if he followed the strategy of an `-type seller, would obtain a higher
expected payo because he would get a better sequence of draws on average, i.e., V 
h () >
V 
` () for  > 0. This means that the value of maintaining reputation is higher for h-type
seller than for `-type seller. But, the value from burning it by falsely claiming good quality
is the same for both types at p
G()+V 
h (0). Hence, whenever an `-type seller is indierent
between lying and not, which is the case when  <   and q = b, an h-type seller prefers
to announce truthfully. By the same token, whenever an `-type seller prefers to tell the
truth, which is the case when q = g, so does an h-type seller.
It remains to consider the case that an h-type seller draws q = b when    . In
this case, he gets V 
h (1) by announcing truthfully and p
G() + V 
h (0) by announcing
untruthfully because 
Bb() = 1 and 
Gb() = 0. Thus, it is optimal for an h-type seller
15Morris (2001) and Bar-Isaac (2003) also use Blackwell's Theorem.
16This is an artefact of assuming 
Bb(0) = 0, and is not essential. It is possible that 
Bb(0) > 0, hence
V 
h (0) > V 
` (0) in equilibrium, which would imply that h-seller is presumed to announce q = b truthfully
when  = 0 (see Proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix). Since what h-seller would do when  = 0 is postulation
of o-equilibrium behavior anyway, such an equilibrium does not aect the set of equilibrium outcomes.
13to announce truthfully if and only if (V 
h (1) V 
h (0))  max  p
G() = 1, or equivalently,
h   ` 
1   

()   h :=
1
h   ` + 1
: (13)
The analysis up to now is summarized below as the rst main result.
Theorem 1 There exists an equilibrium satisfying Condition H if and only if   h: The
equilibrium outcome is unique.
Proof. In Appendix.
4.3 Properties of the equilibrium
The honest equilibrium exhibits several interesting features which we discuss below (and
prove in Appendix). We also highlight the contrast with the pure learning outcome (bab-
bling equilibrium) in price and learning dynamics.
First, the value of building reputation is bounded for `-type sellers however patient
they may be (whereas it tends to innity for h-type sellers as  approaches 1):
Property 2 The value of good reputation for an `-type seller, , is smaller than the
good/bad quality dierential, g   b = 1.
To understand this property, recall that an `-type seller strictly prefers to lie when
 = 1 in the honest equilibrium. This is because otherwise, the value at  = 1 would
be equal to that at  = 0, removing any incentive to be truthful. This means that the
short-term gain from lying when  = 1, which is g b, exceeds the value of lost reputation,
. The willingness to pay for high reputation of an `-type seller known as such, , is
decomposed as follows: moving from  = 0 to  = 1 raises the expected price of the rst
period to g from (1 `)b+`g, and it yields  in future value when the current quality turns
out to be g, which occurs with probability `. Thus,  = g (1 `)b `g+` < g b = 1.
Note that the higher is the probability with which `-type seller lies, the lower is the
short-term gain from cheating because the current price is lower, while the reputational
gain from staying truthful is higher.
We established that if the reputation is high enough, in particular, if    , then an
`-type seller lies with certainty upon drawing a bad quality item because even the smallest
short-term gain, pG(;1), exceeds the maximum possible reputational gain, . Note from
(10) that   > 0 if and only if  > ` = pG(0;1), or equivalently,
 > ` :=
`
1   ` + `2: (14)
The same does not hold for  2 (0;  ). So, the probability of lying should be reduced
until the short-term gain grows enough to balance out the potential reputational gain. This
reduction of lying probability cannot go on all the way to 0 because , the maximum
14possible reputational gain, is bounded away from the short-term gain obtainable when `-
type seller were fully honest by Property 2. Consequently, there is a uniform upper bound
on how honest `-type sellers may be regardless of , as is veried in Appendix:
y
() > ^ y :=
h   `
1   `
for all : (15)
Thus, the market never trusts sellers at a level approaching full condence however patient
they may be. In conjunction with (14), therefore, we obtain
Property 3 If   `, then y() = 1 for all  2 [0;1]. If  > `, then y() is a continuous
function assuming values y() = 1 at  = 0 and     and y() 2 (^ y;1) at all
 2 (0;  ).
Figure 1 illustrates typical y() for  > `.
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The result (15) places an upper bound on the market price for items claimed to be
good: p
G() < pG(; ^ y) =  + (1   ) `
h: However, the aforementioned insight that price
and reputation are correlated is conrmed by the following nding (proved in Appendix):
Property 4 p
G() is strictly increasing in  for  < 1.
This property, that higher reputation results in higher prices, is at the heart of our
equilibrium analysis. It is the main driver of the incentives to build reputation via honest
communication with buyers. Moreover, as intuition suggests, the more patient sellers are
the more trustworthy they become at all levels of reputation, as stated in the next property
(proved in Appendix). Consequently, more patient sellers fetch higher price by announcing
good quality.
Property 5   increases in ; p
G() (resp. y()) strictly increases (resp. decreases) in 
for all  2 (0;  ).
15Notice that our model exhibits a trade-o between short-term transmission of infor-
mation on q via honest announcements of sellers, and the speed of learning on  through
the observation of past records: When y() decreases, the price p
G() increases but the
updated reputation level after an honest announcement of a bad quality, 
Bb(), is lower.
Indeed, truthful announcements of bad quality carry less information on the seller's type
since false announcements are less frequent. Thus, increasing the discount factor fosters
credible communication at a cost of slower learning.
In any case, the lower bound on y() in (15) implies a lower bound on the informational
content on the seller's type conveyed by equilibrium messages. In particular, trustworthy
behavior of sellers is always \good news" for their reputation:
Property 6 
Bb() >  all  > 0.
If h    `, therefore, the equilibrium path has a simple characterization: a seller
lies if and only if he is `-type and draws a bad quality item. Hence, for any seller the
trading price pt of period t increases over time until he draws a bad item, at which point
his type is revealed. Then, pt drops to ` for good if  = `; whilst pt = qt in all subsequent
periods if  = h, i.e., pt reects the true quality.
If  > maxfh;`g, on the other hand, an `-type seller with a reputation below  
randomizes between announcing truthfully and untruthfully upon drawing q = b. As long
as he tells the truth, he builds reputation and thus benets from higher future prices for
items he will announce to be good.
In either case, therefore, the seller's reputation increases over time until one of two
events occurs: i) the seller falsely announces m = G when q = b, in which case his type
is revealed to be ` and the price drops to ` for good; or ii) the seller truthfully announces
m = B when his reputation is  >  , in which case his type is revealed to be h and the
price reects the true quality in the future. In particular, the seller's type gets revealed
whenever a bad quality item is drawn once his reputation exceeded  . Since the reputation
level goes above  within a nite number of periods unless it collapses to zero due to false
announcement, we have:
Property 7 The seller's type is revealed within nite time with probability 1.
As such, a salient characteristic of the equilibrium with credible communication is that
information on seller's type is revealed much more quickly than in the case without com-
munication, where convergence occurs only asymptotically. Compared to the case of pure
learning in Section 3.1, a key dierence concerns updating of reputation following a bad
draw (q = b). In the pure learning outcome it is given by t+1(b) = Bb(t;0) < t.
In the honest equilibrium, reputation improves as long as the seller announces truthfully.
While bad quality is always interpreted as \bad news" in the absence of communication,
it is perceived as \good news" in our model if truthfully announced and facilitates learn-
ing. Since this extra learning eect stems from h-type seller's desire to separate through
more trustworthy behavior, communication helps to mitigate the asymmetric information
problem along two interrelated dimensions: i) it helps credible communication of the true
16quality, and ii) it helps consumers learn the true type of the seller. As explained in the
Introduction, these extra eects are possible because the feedback comments are utilized
to infer the accuracy of pre-trade communication as well as the delivered quality. This
insight should be useful for designing eective feedback systems.
The price dynamics also dier substantially. In an honest equilibrium, the price for
items announced to be good increases over time roughly in line with the reputation until
the seller's type is revealed, while the price stays constant at zero for items announced as
bad. In contrast, the price in the pure learning outcome follows a martingale where the
price of date t is independent of the realization of the quality at date t.
We have fully characterized the honest equilibrium above. What kind of other equi-
libria may there be? We already discussed the babbling equilibrium. Since the pre-trade
announcement is cheap talk, it is not surprising that other equilibria exist. For instance,
babbling may prevail for some reputation levels whilst the honest equilibrium prevails for
other reputation levels. In particular, for any 0 2 (0;1) the following is easily veried to be
an equilibrium from the analysis in this section: the announcements are completely ignored
when   0 and the seller adopts the strategy in the honest equilibrium for  > 0.
One cannot preclude the possibility that still other kinds of equilibria may exist, such
as those in which an h-type seller is not always honest and/or more than two messages
are used. If two distinct messages, say m and n, are used by an h-type seller who is not
fully honest at some reputation , then he sends both messages with positive probabilities
for at least one quality, say q = g. This indierence implies that p











ng() < 1, then
an `-type seller also mixes between sending m and n when q = g, further implying that
V 
h (
ng())   V 
h (
mg()) = V 
` (
ng())   V 
` (
mg()). These are additional restrictions
on equilibrium value functions that are absent for the honest equilibrium. Whether these
additional restrictions may be satised for a non-trivial set of 's in an equilibrium, is a
complex question that is beyond the scope this paper.
5 Outside Option and New-life
Up to now we have assumed that sellers stay in one marketplace forever and that memory
is innite. One of the key issues surrounding the reputation mechanisms based on feedback
systems is that sellers may nd ways to escape from the bad consequences of damaged
reputation. For instance, sellers may change to another marketplace. As emphasized for
instance by Friedman and Resnick (2001), even within a given marketplace it may be
dicult to keep track of the identity of a seller, in which case a seller may have at any date
an option to erase his history by changing his identity and start again as a new seller.17
One may then be concerned that such a possibility may destroy the fundamental rep-
utation mechanism of feedback systems elaborated in Section 4. We show in this section
17The ability to do so depends on the technology used by the platforms. This is known to be an issue
with eBay for instance (Delarocas 2006), but would be less of an issue when the platform controls bank
coordinates or social status of companies, for then it would involve creating a new rm which is costly.
17that this is not the case, although the eectiveness of the mechanism in fostering honest
communication by the seller is reduced.
Addressing this issue requires delineating additional equilibrium dynamic interactions
because the incentive to change identity depends on the market's belief concerning new
sellers, and this belief depends on equilibrium strategies.
Thus, we extend the analysis to a full dynamic setting by augmenting our baseline
model with a stationary entry and exit of sellers in every period: There is a constant
measure 1 of sellers on the platform in each period. Each seller dies with probability  2
(0;1) at the end of each period. These deaths are replaced by measure  of newborn sellers
at the beginning of the next period. Each new born seller is of h-type with probability
i 2 (0;1). We maintain the assumptions that there is a single platform to which each
seller brings an item (of either good or bad quality) for sale in each of innite periods and
that the past record of each seller is publicly known.
Additionally, at the beginning of each period, each seller has an option of escaping
from further consequences of his reputation. We distinguish two ways in which this may
happen. In the rst case, which we refer to as the model \with an outside option," sellers
have an option to exit the platform for another activity that yields an exogenously given
value vo. Thus, a seller joins and remains in the platform only if his equilibrium expected
payo from doing so is larger than vo.
In the second case, which we refer to as the \new-life" model, sellers cannot exit the
platform but may acquire a new identity in any period and restart as if a newborn seller.
So, a \new seller" may be either a newborn or a restarter and buyers cannot distinguish
them. In stationary equilibria of this model, a unique initial value for all new sellers is
endogenously determined and any seller would restart as a new seller if the equilibrium
value associated with his current reputation level falls below the initial value. Thus, from
the perspective of each seller, restarting is equivalent to exiting the platform for an outside
option of this initial value.
5.1 Equilibrium with an outside option
Suppose that sellers, instead of being able to restart, may take an outside option of a
xed value vo > 0 and leave the market at the beginning of any period. We assume
that this decision is irreversible so that a seller who exits never reenters (this would be
the case for instance if there are many platforms that do not allow reentry). Moreover,
we assume that the exit value is the same for both types of sellers, although our results
extend straightforwardly to type-dependent exit values provided that the dierence is not
too large (see our 2009 working paper).
Note that the analysis is equivalent to that in Section 3 if vo  `=(1   ) because
then sellers never exit the platform. Indeed, the equilibrium derived there applies to each
seller, starting from the date of birth when his initial reputation starts at i and period
t is interpreted as the age or seniority of the seller (the number of trading periods since
joining the platform). Since all sellers would exit immediately if vo  1=(1   ) as will be
18veried below, we focus on vo 2 ( `
1 ; 1
1 ) in the sequel.18
Given that age is observed, we can analyze this case by examining the equilibrium for
a representative seller who is born in period 1. An equilibrium then prescribes an entry
decision at birth, and announcement strategy and exit decision of the seller conditional on
entry. As before, focusing on stationary equilibria with state variable t, we are concerned
with the existence and properties of equilibrium that satises Condition H.
As will be outlined below, the analysis and main results are similar to those presented
in Section 3. But, we need additionally to take care of the seller's entry and exit decisions.
Since equilibrium value functions are increasing in the reputation level, a seller would exit
if his reputation falls below the threshold level at which the equilibrium value is lower
than vo (or would not enter if the initial reputation is below this threshold level). In order
to determine this threshold level endogenously, we need to compare the option of exiting
with that of not exiting in the current period for sellers of all possible reputation levels.
To this end, we rst characterize equilibrium of an instrumental \auxiliary model" in
which a newborn seller must trade in the platform in the rst period but may exit in any
future period for an outside option value vo, and his initial reputation level is randomly
assigned to be any level between 0 and 1. Since the initial reputation level may take
any value, we dene and characterize the value function and the strategy for all levels of
 2 [0;1] in this auxiliary game.
Then, by incorporating equilibrium entry decisions into this analysis, we establish the
existence of a stationary equilibrium of the model with an outside option, i.e., when every
seller decides whether to enter the platform or not upon birth with an initial reputation
level i (Theorem 2), and compare with the case without an outside option (Proposition 2).
First, we show that the auxiliary model described above has an equilibrium:






, a stationary equi-






We defer a formal proof to Appendix since it is analogous to that of Theorem 1 with vo
replacing V 
` (0). In particular, the same argument as before veries straightforwardly that
an `-type seller truthfully announces when q = g. Thus, as before the equilibrium strategy
is described by the equilibrium probability of lying by an `-type seller upon drawing q = b,
denoted by yy() to distinguish it from that in Section 3. Let V
y
 denote the value function of















1   (1   )vo
(1   `)
< :
Note also that V
y
` (1) < vo if vo  1=(1 ) and thus, all sellers would exit immediately as
asserted above.
18Note that the upper bound, 1=(1 ), exceeds V 
` (1). This is because as vo increases, so does `-seller's
value at  = 1, V
y
` (1) dened below, maintaining vo < V
y
` (1) as long as vo < 1=(1   ).
19By (16), there is a threshold level y
o, dened by V
y
` (y
o) = vo. Furthermore, analo-
gously to Lemma 1, V
y
` can be shown to be continuous and strictly increasing. Thus, in
any non-initial period an `-type seller would choose to exit the market if and only if his
prevailing reputation level is below y
o. As before, every truthful announcement increases
the reputation until there is a lie by an `-type seller. It is also veried in the proof of
Lemma 2 that from any reputation level, a truthful announcement of bad quality pushes
up the reputation level above y
o in the next period, i.e., for t > 1; t > y
o or t = 0. In
the auxiliary model, therefore, whatever the initial reputation level is at birth, a newborn
seller continues to trade in the platform until he lies on the quality for the rst time, after
which he exits because his type is revealed to be `.
We now return to the model with an outside option, postulating that once on the plat-
form, the seller follows the strategy yy() derived in the auxiliary game. Then each seller,
who is of h-type with probability i, has to choose at birth whether to enter the platform
or to opt for an outside value of vo and leave the market for good. It is straightforward
that if i > y
o, there exists an equilibrium in which every seller enters irrespective of his
type because then the initial reputation level is i and consequently, it is optimal for both




` (i) > V
y
` (y
o) = vo: But, if i < y
o then both
types entering with certainty is not viable since then it would be suboptimal for an `-seller
to enter because V
y
` (i) < V
y
` (y
o) = vo. In this case, a seller randomizes between entering
and not if he is `-type, in such a way that the initial reputation is y
o, as elaborated below.






, there exists a





> 1, in which an h-type seller
enters with probability 1 at birth and the initial reputation upon entry is 1 = maxfi;y
og:
Proof. We already established above that both types entering for sure is an equilibrium if
i > y
o. The same holds if i = y
o. For i < y
o, consider the entry strategy that a seller






o(1 i) 2 (0;1) if `-type. Then the
initial reputation upon entry is y
o by Bayes rule. Conditional on entry, it constitutes a
continuation equilibrium for both types to behave according to the equilibrium identied
in Lemma 2. Moreover, it is optimal for an `-type seller to randomize between entering
and not at birth because V
y
` (y




o) > vo. This completes the proof.
Thus, a new feature of the equilibrium with an outside option is that, when the propor-
tion of `-type is high among newborn sellers, the initial entry stage induces some screening
through self-selection.19 As a consequence, the expected payo at birth is maxfV
y
` (i);vog





o)g for an h-type seller.
While the outside option aects the values of equilibrium variables, the nature of equi-
librium upon entry remains unchanged from the case of no outside option. In particular,
every truthful announcement increases a seller's reputation until there is a lie followed by
an exit. But, the level of trust placed on announcements is lower as explained below.
19An implication is that a platform may be able to improve screening by charging a positive price to join.
20The equations in (16) indicate that the extreme values are higher for `-type seller
when there is an outside option: V
y
` () > V 
` () for  = 0;1. However, the value of a
good reputation (the dierence of the two extreme values) is lower and as a consequence,
an `-type seller lies more. In particular, it remains to be the case that yy() = 1 above
some critical level of reputation, but this threshold is lower than its counterpart without
an outside option,  . Furthermore, below this level an `-type seller lies more frequently
on quality, as formally stated below.





() 8 2 (0;  ) and y
y() = y
() = 1 8 2 [ ;1]: (17)
Proof. In Appendix.
Thus, availability of an option to exit and obtain an outside value (that is larger than
the value attached to bad reputation), results in a uniform increase in the probability that
a bad item is falsely claimed as good. As a consequence, the price for items announced as
good is lower at all levels of reputation. At the same time, note that learning takes place
faster than in the equilibrium without such an option for two reasons. First, it is more
likely that an `-type seller reveals his type by falsely announcing good quality. Second,
reputation gets updated to higher levels following truthful announcements of bad quality,
which also implies that a reputation level is reached sooner at which the seller's type is
revealed for sure if a bad item is drawn (because an `-type seller would denitely lie).
As pointed out earlier, our model exhibits a balance between the short-run reliability
of communication and the speed of revelation of the seller's type over time. The outside
option shifts this balance toward faster separation of types. The impact on h-type sellers'
welfare is ambiguous, however, since they benet from fast reputation building but suer
from lower prices for given levels of reputation.
5.2 New-life
We now extend the analysis to the new-life model, in which there is no outside option
but sellers can freely restart in any period by erasing their history and obtaining a new
identity. We assume that buyers cannot distinguish a newborn seller from an old seller
restarting with a clean record, and focus on stationary equilibria satisfying Condition H,
that is, the proportion of `-type sellers restarting afresh is constant every period, while
h-type sellers never lie and consequently, never change their identities.
In a stationary equilibrium, a constant mass, denoted by 1, of new sellers (newborns
and restarters) appear on the platform in each period and they start with a reputation
level set at an endogenous default level, denoted by 1, which reects the mix of genuine
newborn sellers (of which a proportion i are of type h) and equilibrium mass of sellers
who restart. Let v1 denote the value of an `-type seller starting at the \default reputation
level" 1. Notice that the value function depends on v1, while the fraction 1 depends on
both the value function and v1.
21To determine 1 and v1 endogenously, we start by treating v1 as a parameter represent-
ing an outside option value to be obtained when an `-type seller exits the market, so that
we can apply the result from the previous section to determine the equilibrium strategy
and value function of `-type seller that are consistent with v1, which we denote by yy
v1 and
V y
v1, respectively, to emphasize their dependence on v1.
From Section 5.1 we know that in the equilibrium identied in Lemma 2 (with v1
playing the role of vo), an `-type seller will change identity only when his reputation has
fallen to t = 0 after a lie. Based on this, we derive in Appendix the proportion (v1)
of `-type sellers starting at a given period, who will change identity and restart in some
future period as










Here, Pr(hk) is the ex ante probability that an `-type seller remains in the platform without
having cheated after a k-period quality history hk 2 Hk := fg;bgk according to yy
v1; and
(hk) is posterior reputation for a seller who has survived the history hk without cheating,
updated according to yy
v1 from initial reputation 1.
Since the mass of new `-type sellers at each date is 1(1   1); the mass of sellers
who change their identities in a stationary equilibrium is 1(1   1)(v1). Therefore,
stationarity dictates that the mass of new sellers is
1 =  + 1(1   1)(v1): (19)





Solving (19) and (20) simultaneously, we dene a mapping 
y
1 : ( `
1 ; 1








where the inequality follows from 0 < (v1) < 1. This mapping determines the unique
initial reputation level of new sellers, that is consistent with a given value v1 of a new seller
of type `. Thus, the equation v1 = V y
v1(
y
1(v1)) must hold in a stationary equilibrium. By
solving this equation for v1, we show that
Theorem 3 If sellers can freely change identity, there exists a stationary equilibrium sat-
isfying Condition H if h and  are suciently large (but less than 1). In this equilibrium,
the default reputation level is lower than i and `-type sellers lie more than they do when
identities cannot be changed.
Proof. In Appendix.
22The main conclusion is thus that allowing sellers to change identity at no cost doesn't
invalidate our result that equilibria exist in which sellers of high ability always communi-
cate truthfully. Of course it impedes somewhat the power of incentives: Since Proposition
2 applies in any stationary equilibrium, sellers' announcements are less reliable than when
fresh restart with a new identity is not possible. However, this does not mean that un-
truthful announcements are more frequent in the market when restarts are possible than
when they are not: `-type sellers who have lied once, rather than keep lying forever when
q = b, would start afresh and announce according to yy
v1(1). In fact, when  is close to
1 there will be more truthful announcements in the market when sellers are allowed to
restart with a new identity.
Nevertheless, h-type sellers tend to suer more due to untrustworthy behavior of `-type
sellers when restarts are possible for two reasons. First, as in the case of an outside option,
the reduced reliability of `-type sellers results in lower prices for h-type sellers. Notice that
the price prole is the same as that when the seller had an exogenous outside option of
value vo = v1. Second, newborn h-type sellers suer from depressed reputation at birth
due to the restarters boosting the fraction of `-type in the pool of new sellers (1 < i).
In particular, contrary to the case of an outside option, the decline in condence and
in prices doesn't necessarily get translated to a faster revelation of the seller's type. Since
sellers start with a lower initial reputation level, it may take longer for an h-type seller to
be identied as such by the market. Overall, the possibility to restart one's activity on a
platform with a new identity reduces the credibility of communication without necessarily
enhancing the separation dynamics of seller types.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigate the extent to which the quality of product can be credibly
communicated to prospective buyers in experience good markets. We show that if there is
adverse selection on seller's ability (in supplying good quality items), credible communica-
tion can be sustained by reputational motives in spite of the inherent conict of interests
between sellers and buyers. In addition, if sellers can restart with a new identity, a station-
ary equilibrium exists but the reliability of sellers' announcements deteriorates uniformly
across all reputation levels.
To focus on the reputational incentives in pre-trade communication, we carried out
our analysis in a model of pure adverse selection on seller's ability. However, the analysis
can be extended to situations that involve moral hazard. To see this, modify the baseline
model in such a way that in each period a seller draws an item of good quality with a
probability h if he exerted high eort at a cost of c > 0 that depends on the seller's type
 2 fh;`g, but he draws a good item with a probability ` if he exerted low eort at zero
cost. Note that our honest equilibrium continues to be an equilibrium in this modied
model if ch is small enough for an h-type seller to nd it worthwhile to exert high eort,
but c` is large so that an `-type seller nds otherwise.20 If pre-trade communication is not
20This is the case if (V 
h (Bb(;y())   ch
1    V 
h (0))  pG(;y()) for all , and the inequality
23possible, this model is equivalent to the baseline model of Mailath and Samuelson (2001)
without replacement of types, for which they show that high eort cannot be induced
unless discontinuous strategies are allowed (Proposition 2, p424). Our result suggests that
pre-trade communication may motivate the more ecient type to exert high eort by
facilitating the learning process in the market.
We anticipate that our analysis can be extended in other directions as well. For in-
stance, in the context of internet markets, to examine the eect of competition between
trading websites appears as an interesting task from the market design perspective, par-
ticularly because rival websites would inuence each other by providing exit values as our
results suggest. Analysis of such competition may also carry implications on the market
segmentation between trading websites and their pricing strategies. At the same time, it
also seems fruitful to explore other routes that might enhance the value of online reputa-
tion, for instance, via creating a market for trading online identities a la Tadelis (1999).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
For completeness, we state and prove (as Lemmas) all the assertions made without full
verications in the informal analysis preceding the statement of Proposition 1. Recall that
in the rst paragraph of Section 4.1 we proved that V 
` (0) = `=(1   ) and adopted the
convention that y(0) = 1 without loss of generality. Note that this conclusion is valid in
all equilibria of  , i.e., without imposing any restrictions (not even the condition H).
Since, for any , some weighted average of p
G() and p
B() is equal to the expected
quality h + `(1   ), any seller can get a price no lower than ` in every period, and a
price strictly greater than ` in the rst period if  > 0. Therefore,
V






8 > 0: (22)
Let z() denote the equilibrium probability that an `-seller of reputation  lies upon
drawing q = g.
Lemma 3 In any honest equilibrium, z() = 0 for all  2 [0;1] and V 
` (1)  V` :=
`
1  +  =
1 (1 `+`2)
(1 )(1 `) > V 
` () for all  < 1.
Proof. We already established that y(0) = 1 and z(0) = 0 by convention in the rst
paragraph of Section 4.1. First, we show that p
G() > p
B() for all  2 (0;1]. This is
immediate if y() = 0 or  = 1, because then p
G() = 1 and p
B() < 1 by the condition
is reversed if c` replaces ch, where V 
h (0) = `
1  = V 
` (0) and y, V 
` and V 
h are as derived in Section
4. Such values of ch and c` exist because i) (V 
h (Bb(;y())   V 
h (0)) > pG(;y()) for    
if  > h due to (13), ii) (V 
` (Bb(;y())   V 
` (0)) = pG(;y()) by denition of V 
` , and iii)
V 
h (Bb(;y()) > V 
` (Bb(;y()) +  for some  > 0 due to (47), continuity of V 
 for  > 0, and







24H and Bayes rule. If y() > 0 for  2 (0;1), lying is no worse than telling the truth when
q = b so that p
G() + V 
` (
Gb())  p
B() + V 
` (
Bb()), while 
Gb() = 0 < 
Bb().
These two inequalities, together with (22), imply that p
G() > p
B() as desired.
Now, to prove the Lemma by contradiction, suppose z() > 0 for some  > 0. If
 < 1, this would imply that 
Bg() = 0 <  < 
Gg() by condition H and Bayes rule.
Then, due to (22) and p
G() > p







Bg()), i.e., telling the truth would be strictly better than lying when q = g.
Since this would contradict z() > 0, we conclude that z() = 0 for all  2 (0;1).




1 ` by lying if and only if q = b. Thus, V 
` (1)  V` > V 
` (0).
We now show that V` > V 
` () 8 < 1: To reach a contradiction, suppose V`  V 
` ()
for some  < 1. First, consider the case that sup<1 V 
` () > V`. Then, one can nd
arbitrary small  > 0 and  < 1 such that
V














Since z() = 0 as shown above, if y() = 0 then V 
` () = `p
G() + (`V 
` (
Gg()) +
(1   `)V 
` (
Bb()))  ` +  sup<1 V 
` () < ` + (V 
` () + ) ) V 
` () < V 
` (0) + 
1 ,
contradicting (23); If y() > 0, on the other hand, V 
` () = p




` (0)) < 1+(`(V 
` ()+)+(1 `)V (0)) ) V 
` () < V`+ 
1 `, violating (23).
It remains to consider the case that sup<1 V 
` () = V`, so that V` = V 
` (~ ) for some
~  < 1. Since z(~ ) = 0 as shown above, if y(~ ) = 0 then V 






Bb(~ )))  `+V 
` (~ ) ) V 
` (~ )  V 
` (0), contradicting (22); If y(~ ) > 0, on the
other hand, V 




` (0)) < 1+(`V 
` (~ )+(1 `)V (0)) )
V 
` (~ ) < V`, contradicting V 
` (~ ) = V` asserted above.
Thus, we have proved V` > V 
` () for all  < 1. Finally, together with V 
` (1)  V`
shown above, this dictates that z(1) = 0 because p
G(1) + V 
` (
Gg(1)) = 1 + V 
` (1) >
p
B(1) + V 
` (
Bg(1)):
For  2 (0;1), because of (22) and Lemma 3, y() = 0 would imply that the short-
term gain from lying when q = b; which is p
G() p





Bb())   V (
Gb())

<  because  < 1 as asserted in (6), contradicting
the optimality of y() = 0. Hence, given the convention y(0) = 1 adopted earlier, we
have
y
() > 0 8 2 [0;1) (24)
Furthermore, in light of Lemma 3 and Bayes rule, without loss of generality we set
p







Bg() = 0 8 2 [0;1] (25)
as asserted in the main text, subject to the following caveat: Determining 
Gb(1) is a little
delicate because it determines the value of V 
` (1) and thereby, the optimality of y() = 1
for  < 1 via determining the deviation value when an `-seller with reputation  announced
truthfully upon drawing q = b, which would induce reputation 
Bb() = 1: The value of
25
Gb(1) also plays a salient role for a seller of \maximal reputation"  = 1, who, upon
drawing q = b, has a choice between maintaining its reputation with a low current price
(p
B(1) = 0), and a high current price of p
G(1) = 1 followed by a drop of future payo from
V 
 (1) to V 
 (
Gb(1)) due to lost reputation.
However, notice that  = 1 for  = ` and 
Gb(1) occur only o the equilibrium path,
which allows us to conclude:
Lemma 4 For any honest equilibrium, there exists an honest equilibrium with the same
strategy of seller (i.e., the same y()) and 
Gb(1) = 0, so that, in particular, V 
` (1) = V`:
Proof. First, we prove y(1) = 1. To do so, suppose otherwise, i.e., y(1) < 1. Then,



































+ (1   `)V

` (1) = ` + V

` (1) ) V

` (1)  `=(1   );
contradicting (22). This proves y(1) = 1.
Now, given any honest equilibrium, suppose we reset 
Gb(1) = 0 without changing
y(). Then, the value V 
` (1) is lower and equal to V`; while V 
` () is unchanged for  < 1
(because V 
` (1) does not aect V 
` () for  < 1). Hence, the incentive compatibility for
an `-seller is preserved for  < 1. It is preserved for  = 1 as well since 1 + V 
` (0) > V`.
For an h-seller, the value function V 
h () is unchanged. Since 
Gb(1) is relevant only for
the o equilibrium contingency that an h-seller lies when  = 1, it only remains to verify
that the incentive compatibility condition continues to hold at  = 1. For this, note (i)






G() ! 1 and 
Bb() ! 1 as  ! 1 and consequently, the expected discounted sum
of future prices from truth-telling, V 
h (), is left-continuous at  = 1. Hence, it follows
that V 
h (1)  p
G(1) + V 
h (0), conrming the incentive compatibility at  = 1.
Consequently, we focus on equilibria with 
Gb(1) = 0 and V 
` (1) = V` in the sequel,
without loss of generality in the sense that it is inconsequential for the equilibrium outcome.








` (1) = V
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ht + (1   )`t > : (28)













































The next lemma describes an `-seller's equilibrium behavior for large .
Lemma 5 For any honest equilibrium, there exists   < 1 (dened in (10)) such that
y() = 1 if  >  . Furthermore, V 
` () is continuous and strictly increasing on ( ;1]
(with 
Gb(1) = 0).
Proof. For suciently large  < 1, the payo from lying when q = b is arbitrarily close
to 1 while that from telling the truth is bounded above by (V`   V 
` (0)) =  < 1. This
means that y() = 1 for suciently large :
Since pG(;y) is decreasing in y, we deduce that y() = 1 so long as pG(;1)  ,
i.e., for all     where   is dened in (10). Then, since y(t
Gg())) = 1 for all t for any
    by (28), (29) uniquely determines V 
























which is continuous and strictly increasing in  >   because both pG(;1) and 
Gg() are
continuous and strictly increasing in . Moreover, lim!1 V 
` () = V`, verifying continuity
at  = 1.
The next lemma is useful in proving that V 
` is continuous and increasing (Lemma 1).
Lemma 6 In any honest equilibrium, if y() is continuous on an interval (0;1] then
Bb(;y()) >  for all  2 (0;1), and p
G() and V 
` () are continuous and strictly
increasing in  2 (0;1].
Proof. The proof is immediate if 0    by Lemma 5. Hence, we consider the case that
0 <   below. Let 0 2 (0;  ] be such that V 
` () is continuous and strictly increasing in
 2 (0;1]. It exists by Lemma 5. We proceed by showing that the properties in Lemma
6 hold on (0   ";1] for small enough " > 0, in three steps as below.
Step 1: First, we verify that
Bb(;y
()) >  8 2 [
0;1): (31)
To reach a contradiction, suppose to the contrary that there is some  2 [0;1) such that
Bb(;y())  . Then, by continuity of Bb(;y) and y() on (0;1], we can dene
~  = maxf < 1 j Bb(;y
())  g 2 [
0;  ): (32)
27Here, ~  2 [0;  ) follows because for  2 [ ;1), by Lemma 5, y() = 1 and thus,
Bb(;y()) = 1 > . By continuity, we also have Bb(~ ;y(~ )) = ~ .
It is easily veried from (3) that
Bb(;y)   () y  ^ y = (h   `)=(1   `); (33)
which implies that y(~ ) = ^ y and thus
pG(~ ; ^ y) = (V

` (~ )   V

` (0)): (34)
Note from (28) that t
Gg(~ ) > ~  for t  1 and thus, Bb(t
Gg(~ );y(t
Gg(~ ))) > t
Gg(~ ) by
(32). Consequently, y(t
Gg(~ )) > ^ y by (33). Therefore, since pG(;y)  1 and pG(;y)
decreases in y, (30) implies that
V














Since pG(; ^ y) =
 
(h   `) + `

=h from (1) and (33), we further deduce from (35) that
V

` (~ )   V











< pG(~ ; ^ y)   ` +
1 X
t=1






= pG(~ ; ^ y)   ` + (1   `)
`
1   `
= pG(~ ; ^ y)  
(1   )`
1   `
< pG(~ ; ^ y)
where the second inequality follows from t
Gg(~ ) < 1. Thus, we have reached a contradic-
tory conclusion that (34) cannot hold at ~ . This completes the proof of (31).
Step 2: We now show that
[A] p
G() and V 
` () are continuous and strictly increasing in  2 (0 ";1] for suciently
small " > 0.
For  > 0 ", let us dene y as the unique solution of Bb(;y) = 0. For suciently
small " > 0, (31) and continuity of y() imply that y() > y for all  > 0   ".
Consider the graph of (V 
` (Bb(;)) V 
` (0)) as a function of y, called the \loss graph."
Because V 
` () is continuous and strictly increases in  2 (0;1] and Bb(;y) > 0 for all
 > 0   " and y > y by denition of y, for  > 0   " and y > y the loss graph:
i) is continuous and strictly increases in y with terminal value (V 
` (1) V 
` (0)) = ;
ii) continuously \shifts downward" as  decreases.
On the other hand, the graph of pG(;) as a function of y 2 [0;1], which we call the \gain
graph,"
iii) is continuous and strictly decreases in y for y < 1, and
28iv) continuously shifts downward as  decreases.
In addition, when  =   the two graphs touch at y = y( ) = 1.
Consider  2 (0   ";  ). Given that y() > y for  2 (0   ";  ], which is implied
by (31) and continuity of y at 0 for suciently small " > 0, the loss graph and the gain
graph cross at a unique point in (y;1], which must be equal to y() because y() > y.
Since, in the domain y > y; the two graphs shift continuously as  changes in (0  
";  ], both this unique intersection point, y(), and the value of the gain graph at the
intersection point, p
G(), change continuously in (0   ";  ]. Furthermore, since the two
graphs strictly shift upward as  increases in (0   ";  ], it follows that p
G() strictly
increases in  2 (0   ";  ]. Consequently, in conjunction with y() = 1 for    , we
have veried that p
G() is continuous and strictly increasing in  2 (0   ";1]: Equation
(30) ensures that the same property holds for V 
` () and thereby, [A] above.
Step 3: As the last step of the proof, let 0  0 be the inmum of 0 2 (0;  ] such
that V 
` () is continuous and strictly increasing in  2 (0;1]. If 0 > 0, (31) and [A]
would lead to a contradiction to the fact that 0 is the inmum of such points, completing
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we show that y is continuous at all  2 (0;1]. We already
showed that it is continuous on [0;1] for some 0 <   in the preceding proof.
To reach a contradiction, suppose y is discontinuous at some points and let d 2 (0;0]
be the supremum of these points. Then y is continuous at all  > d. By Lemma 6,
Bb(;y()) >  for all  2 (d;1), and p
G() and V 
` () are continuous and strictly
increasing in  2 (d;1]. This means that for  2 (d;  ), the values y() and p
G() are
determined by the unique intersection point of the gain graph and the loss graph on the
range of y such that Bb(;y)  d.






` (0) < pG(Bb(;y



























These inequalities cannot hold if lim#d y() = ^ y, because Bb(d; ^ y) = d. Hence,
lim#d y() > ^ y:
If y()  ^ y +" in a neighborhood of d for some " > 0; then since Bb(;y()) > d,
the same logic used to prove [A] would verify that y(:) is continuous in a neighborhhod of
d, contradicting the denition of d: Hence, there exist a sequence n (< d) converging
to d such that limn!+1 y(n)  ^ y < lim#d y():
In particular, limn!+1 pG(n;y(n)) > lim#d p
G(). Since y() < 1 for  = n and








29holds for  = n and  2 (d;  ). Thus, limn!+1 V 
` (Bb(n;y(n))) > lim#d V 
` (Bb(;y())):










Take 00 < d such that V 
` (00) is arbitrarily close to supd V 
` () < V 
` (1).21 Con-
sider the unique + > d such that V 
` (+) = supd V 
` (). Then, Bb(+;y(+)) > +












We then verify that p
G(+)  p
G(00): This is immediate if Bb(+;y(+)) = 1 since
p
G(00) < (V 
` (1) V 
` (0)): If Bb(+;y(+)) < 1; the gain and loss graphs for 00 cannot
cross at any y such that V 
` (Bb(00;y)) > V 
` (Bb(+;y(+)). To see this, note that
the two graphs crossing at such y would require that Bb(00;y) > Bb(+;y(+)) and
thus y > y(+), but this would imply that (37) holds with equality and, therefore,
pG(00;y) < p
G(+) < (V 
` (Bb(00;y))   V 
` (0)); contradicting the two graphs crossing at
y. Then, y(00) < 1 and thus, p
G(00) = (V 
` (Bb(00;y(00)))   V 
` (0))  p
G(+) from
(37), verifying the claim.
Furthermore, V 
` (






` is strictly increasing in  > + and V 
` (+) = supd V 
` (): In light of (27), these
observations dictate V 
` (00) < V 
` (+), contradicting to V 
` (00) being arbitrarily close to
supd V 
` () = V 
` (+). Therefore, we conclude that y is continuous at all  2 (0;0].
By Lemma 6, this means that V 
` is continuous and strictly increasing on (0;1].
Finally, consider the possibility that V 
` is discontinuous at  = 0, i.e., V 
` (0) <
V 
` (0+) = lim#0 V 
` (). If (V 
` (0+)   V 
` (0))  ` = pG(0;1), then y() ! 1 as  ! 0
and thus, we would have V 
` (0+) = ` + (`V 
` (0+) + (1   `)V 
` (0)) ) V 
` (0+) = V 
` (0), a
contradiction. If (V 
` (0+) V 
` (0)) > `, then lim#0 p
G() = (V 
` (0+) V 
` (0)) and thus,
we would have V 
` (0+) = (V 
` (0+)   V 
` (0)) + (`V 
` (0+) + (1   `)V 
` (0)) ) V 
` (0+) =
 `V 
` (0)=(1      `) ) V 
` (0+)   V 
` (0) = `
+` 1 > `
` > 1 > , a contradiction to
V 
` () < V 
` (1) for all  < 1 (Lemma 3). This completes the proof.
Next, to characterize V 
` as a xed point of the operator dened on F, we extend the
denition of the \pseudo-best-response" function yV to all function V 2 F. Note that since
  is independent of V , (9) determines yV(0) = yV() = 1 for all    . For 0 <  <  ; we




0))   V (0))  pG(;y)   (V (Bb(;y))   V (0)): (38)





1 if  >  
the unique y that satises (38) if 0 <    
1 if  = 0:
(39)
21The last inequality: For V 
` () to be arbitrarily close to V 
` (1) for some   d, we need p
G()
arbitrarily close to 1 by (27), but then y() = 1 would be optimal due to  < 1, contradicting p
G()
being arbitrarily close to 1.
30Lemma 7 For any V 2 F; yV() is continuous and strictly positive on [0;1] and pG(;yV())
is nondecreasing in .
Proof. For each  2 (0;  ], by construction, yV() is the value of y at which the gain graph
of pG(;y) intersects with the \connected" loss graph of (V (Bb(;y))   V (0)), i.e., the
latter graph is connected vertically at every discontinuity points by the shortest distance.
Since both of the graphs are continuous as functions of , the intersection point changes
continuously in , i.e., yV() is continuous on  2 (0;  ]. Since pG(;0) = 1 >  by (1),
the intersection takes place at some y > 0, establishing that yV() > 0 for  2 (0;  ] as
well as when  = 0 and  >   as per (39).
Furthermore, note that yV() ! 1 as  ! 0 because, for every y < 1, Bb(;y) ! 0 as
 ! 0 and thus, (V (Bb(;y))   V (0)) < `  pG(;y) for all  suciently small. Since
yV( ) = 1 by construction (using yV(0) = 1 if   = 0), it follows that yV() is continuous
on [0;1].
For    , we have pG(;yV()) = pG(;1) which increases in  by (1). For  2 (0;  ),
the two aforementioned graphs move upward as  increases because both pG(;y) and
Bb(;y) increases in  by (1) and (3), respectively. Hence, the height of the intersection
point also increases, i.e., pG(;yV()) weakly increases in .
Since 
Gg() increases in , T(V ) as dened in (11) is non-decreasing and right-
continuous in  by Lemma 7. In addition, T(V )(0) = pG(0;1) + (`V (0) + (1   `)V (0))
which yields T(V )(0) = `=(1 ); and T(V )(1) = 1+(`V (1)+(1 `)V (0)) which yields
T(V )(1) = `=(1   ) + . Hence, the operator T is well-dened on F by (11).
Lemma 8 In any honest equilibrium, V 
` is a xed point of T and y() = yV 
` ().
Proof. For any equilibrium value function V 
` , (8) and (39) imply that y() = yV 
` ()
for all . Since y() = yV 
` () > 0 by Lemma 7, we deduce from (7), (8) and (11) that
T(V 
` )() = V 
` () for all :
By combining Lemmas 1{8, at this point we have proved all claims of Proposition 1
except the existence and uniqueness of the xed point, which we now turn to.
Proof of existence. Endowed with the topology of the weak convergence, the set F is
convex and compact (Theorem 5.1, Billingsley, 1999). By Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point
Theorem,22 therefore, T has a xed point in F if T is continuous on F, which we show
below.
Consider a sequence Vn, n = 1;2;, in F that weakly converges to V 2 F. To
prove continuity of T, we show below that T(Vn) weakly converges to T(V ), i.e., T(Vn)()
converges to T(V )() at all continuity points of T(V ) (Theorem 2.1, Billingsley, 1999).
Let 
 be the set of all points where V (
Gg()) is continuous. Since 
Gg() is increasing,
[0;1]n
 is countable. Since V is continuous at 
Gg() if  2 
 by continuity of 
Gg, weak
convergence of Vn implies that Vn(
Gg()) converges to V (
Gg()) on 
.
22This theorem (Fan, 1952; Glicksberg, 1952) states that an upper hemi-continuous convex valued
correspondence from a nonempty compact convex subset of a convex Hausdor topological vector space
has a xed point.
31Next, Let yV() be as dened in (39) for V and yVn() for Vn. Let  be the set of points
where V (Bb(;yV())) is continuous. Since Bb(;yV()) is non-decreasing on (0;1] as
veried in the proof of Lemma 7, [0;1]n is countable. We now show that yVn() ! yV()
for all  2 .
Consider  2 . That yVn() ! yV() is trivial from (39) if  = 0 or  >  . Hence,
suppose 0 <     so that, denoting V  





n (Bb(;yVn()))   V (0)

 pG(;yVn())  
 
Vn(Bb(;yVn()))   V (0)

: (40)
By taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that yVn() converges to a limit y0.
To reach a contradiction, suppose y0 6= yV(). First, consider the case that y0 < yV().
Then, since pG(;y) decreases with  there exists " > 0 such that
pG(;yVn()) > pG(;yV()) + " = 
 
V (Bb(;yV()))   V (0)

+ "
for suciently large n, where the equality follows because  2 . From this we further
deduce that
pG(;yVn()) > (Vn(Bb(;yV()))   V (0)) + "=2
> (Vn(Bb(;yVn()))   V (0)) + "=2
for suciently large n, where the rst inequality follows because Vn(Bb(;yV())) !
V (Bb(;yV())) for  2  and the second because Bb(;y) increases in y and yVn() !
y0 < yV(). However, this contradicts (40).
For the case y0 > yV(), we can apply the same reasoning using V  
n (Bb(;yVn())) 





n (Bb(;yVn()))   V (0)

  "=2:
Hence, we conclude that yVn() ! yV() for all  2 .
Together with the earlier result that Vn(
Gg()) ! V (
Gg()) for all  2 
, this
establishes for all  2 
 \  that




Gg()) + (1   `)V (0)





Gg()) + (1   `)V (0)

= T(V )()
as n ! 1. Finally, to verify this convergence at every continuity point of T(V )(),
observe rst that this convergence is trivial from (39) at  = 0;1. For any other  62 
\
at which T(V ) is continuous, one can nd 1 2 
 \  \ (0;) arbitrarily close to 
and 2 2 
 \  \ (;1) arbitrarily close to  because 
 \  is dense in [0;1]. Since
T(Vn)(1)  T(Vn)()  T(Vn)(2) and T(V )(1)  T(V )()  T(V )(2), taking the
limits we get










32which imply, as desired, that T(Vn)() converges to T(V )() at every continuity point of
T(V )(). This proves that T is continuous and thus, completes the proof of existence.
Proof of uniqueness. To reach a contradiction, suppose there are two xed points V 1
and V 2. Notice that V 1 and V 2 are continuous by Lemma 1 and
V
i() = pG(;1) +  (`V (1) + (1   `)V (0)) 8   ; i = 1;2; (41)
in particular, V 1() = V 2() for all    . Thus, the following is well-dened:





0  g 2 (0;  ]: (42)
A \segment" for i = 1;2, is a nonempty interval Ii = [x;z]  [0;  ] such that V i() > V j()
for all  2 (x;z) and V i() = V j() for  = x;z, where j 6= i. A \region" for i = 1;2, is
a nonempty interval Ri = [x;z]  [0;  ] such that V i()  V j() for all  2 Ii and there
are x0;z0 2 Ri such that [x;x0] and [z0;z] are segments for i. Let
p
i
G() := pG(;yV i()) and 
i
Bb() := Bb(;yV i()) for i = 1;2: (43)
Recall that in the proof of Lemma 7, we have shown that both pi
G() and i
Bb() weakly




Bb() strictly increase in .
Next, we establish the following:
[C] If V 1(i
Bb()) = V 2(i





Bb(). If, in addition, V 1(
Gg()) =
V 2(
Gg()) holds, then V 1() = V 2().











8 2 (0;  ]; (44)
V 1(i
Bb()) = V 2(i
Bb()) implies p1
G() = p2
G(), which in turn implies yV 1() = yV 2(),
from which the remaining claims of [C] follow.
Finally, since i
Bb(^ ) > ^  by Lemma 6 and 
Gg(^ ) > ^  by (4), due to continuity, there
is 0 < ^  such that V 1(0) 6= V 2(0), i
Bb(0) > ^  and 
Gg(0) > ^ . Then, V 1(i
Bb(0)) =
V 2(i
Bb(0)) by (42) and thus, V 1(0) = V 2(0) by [C], a contradiction to the earlier
assertion that V 1(0) 6= V 2(0). This completes the proof of uniqueness, hence the proof
of Proposition 1.
B. Other Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. By construction, optimality of `-seller strategy is satises for
y = yV 
` at all  > 0 where V 
` is the unique xed point of T. At  = 0, it is satised if

Bb(0), which is undened by Bayes rule, is not too high, e.g., when 
Bb(0) = 0.
33Recall V 
h is h-seller's value function given the price schedule p
m and transition rule



















for  > 0 (45)
where Ht
g := fg;bgt 1fgg is the set of all possible realizations of q for t periods with the
requirement that q = g in period t; (ht) is the ex ante probability that ht2Ht
g realizes;
(ht;) is the posterior belief at the beginning of period t calculated by Bayes rule from the
prior belief  along ht. Observe that V 
h () is increasing in  because pG(;y()); 
Gg()




Bg() = 0, upon drawing q = g it is clearly optimal for
an h-seller is to announce m = G truthfully. It remains to show optimality of truthful
announcement upon drawing q = b.
For  2 [ ;1], this follows from (13) because Bb(;y()) = 1 and pG(;y())  1.















` (0) = V 
h (0) from (12), while
V

h () > V

` () 8 > 0 (47)














This proves optimality of truthful announcement upon drawing q = b for  > 0.
We already veried that lying when  = 0 and q = b is optimal for h-seller with

Bb(0) = 0, which completes verication of an honest equilibrium. Other honest equilibria
may exist that dier in what h-seller does when  = 0 and q = b. But since consistency
requires that an h-seller starts with an initial reputation level  > 0 and an h-seller
always tells the truth as per Condition H, the dierence pertains to o-equilibrium path.
Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is unique.
Finally, we prove (47). Let Vh() be the value function from the following strategy of
an h-seller: always report q = g truthfully and upon drawing q = b for the rst time report
m = G and get V 






















Gg() is as dened in (28). Since V 
h ()  Vh() is clear from denition of V 
h , it
suces to show Vh()   V 







































(1   h)(1   `)
 
(1   )(h   `)
(1   h)(1   `)
V

` (0) = 0:
This completes proof of Theorem 1. For later use, however, we also prove the following
nested result:
[S] If h > 1+
p
1+4`2+4`3
2+2` and  is large enough, there exists an honest equilibrium in which
h-seller announces truthfully even when  = 0.





















h () = V
o
















8 > 0: (50)









































































































































h(1   h)(1   `)
(1   (1   h))2 +
h2(h2   `)(1   `)`
(`(1   ) + h2)2 ; (53)
35the derivative of which is
 2(1   `)
h(1   h)2
(1   (1   h))3  
`(h3   h`)2
(`(1   ) + h2)3 < 0: (54)
If h > 1+
p
1+4`2+4`3
2+2` , it is routinely veried that (53) evaluated at  = 1 is positive and
thus, (53) is positive for all  due to (54). This further implies that (52) is positive for all








8    (55)




Next, let m = minfj
Gg()    and Bb(;y())   g and consider  2 [m;  ].
Note that m <   due to Lemmas 1 and 6. Since
V


































d , which exists almost everywhere because both V 
h () and
V 






















which is positive due to (55) because pG(;y()) = 
 
V 















Setting Bb(0;1) = lim!0 Bb(;y()) and V 
h (0) = lim!0 V 
h (), this implies that
h-seller prefers to tell the truth upon drawing q = b whenever `-seller is indierent, i.e.,
when  2 (0;  ]. Then, truth-telling is optimal when  = 0 and q = b by continuity of V 
h ,
pG(;y()), 





Proof of Properties 2{7. Properties 2 and 7 are already proved in the main text. For
Property 3, it only remains to prove (15). This is done in the proof of Lemma 6 which
also proves Property 6. Property 4 is proved by applying the argument in the proof of
Lemma 7 of verifying monotonicity of pG(;yV()) to V 
` which is continuous and strictly
increasing by Lemma 1.
We now prove Property 5. It is clear from (6), (1) and (10) that   strictly increases in .
Consider 0 <  < 0 < 1 and let y(j) and y(j0) denote y() for dierent  and similarly
for other equilibrium variables. To reach a contradiction, suppose that y(j)  y(j0)
for some  2 (0;  ) where   is associated with . Then, 0 = maxf <  jy(j) 




` (0j)   V 
` (0)) = 0(V 
` (0j0)   V 
` (0)). However, since y(j)  y(j0) for all














































This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider an honest equilibrium in which a seller never lies upon
drawing a good quality item, so that it is characterized by the probability yy() that an
`-seller lies when q = b and the value functions V
y
 for  = h;`. Adopting the convention,
for the same reason as before, that an `-seller always announce G when  = 0, we have
V
y
` (0) = p
G(0)+ maxfvo;V
y
` (0)g = `+vo > `
1 ; and, analogously to (24), V
y
` () > V
y
` (0)
is immediate for all  > 0. In addition, an argument analogous to the proof of Lemma 4
establishes that without loss of generality we may set 
y





Thus, in particular, we have veried (16). Consequently, the relevant steps within the
proof of Proposition 1 extend straightforwardly to verify that V
y
` is continuous and strictly
increasing in .
Dene Fvo to be the set of all non-decreasing and right-continuous functions V on [0;1]
such that V (0) = V
y
` (0) and V (1) = V
y
` (1). Dene y
y
V() in the same manner as in (38)
and (39) with V (0) replaced by vo and   replaced by  y := inff j pG(;1) > vog <  
where the last inequality follows from vo < . As long as vo > ` so that y
y
V() < 1
for some , which we assume below (else, y
y
V()  1 and the proof is simpler), we have
y
y
V() 2 (0;1) for  2 (0;  y) with lim!0 y
y




approaches vo> ` as y ! 1 while it approaches 0 as  ! 0 for all y < 1.23 Furthermore,
y
y
V() is clearly continuous and assumes 1 for    y. Dene Tvo : Fvo ! Fvo as






Gg())g + (1   `)vo

: (56)
It is straightforward to verify that Tvo(V ) 2 Fvo.
Then, the proof of Proposition 1 extend to Tvo, establishing that, for any vo 2 ( `
1 ; 1
1 ),
there is a unique xed point of Tvo and it is continuous and strictly increasing. We omit the
proofs because they are analogous with straightforward changes due to the seller opting
to restart whenever his reputation level is so low that the continuation value falls short of
vo.24
Since the outside option value is vo for an h-seller as well, optimality of truth-telling
for h-seller can be veried by an argument analogous to that leading to Theorem 1, with
23Note that this implies V (Bb(;y
y
V ()))   vo > pG(;y
y
V ()) for all  2 (0;  y). Thus, an h-seller
with any reputation  > 0 does not exit after trading a bad quality item because the value of updated
reputation exceeds vo as this inequality shows. However, both types of seller may exit after trading a good
quality item in the initial period if the value of the updated reputation, V
y
 (
Gg(i)), falls short of vo.






Gg()))   `) +
vo(1 `)+`
1 `
and thus, (35) becomes V
y
` (~ )   vo <
P1
t=0(pG(t
Gg(~ ); ^ y)   `)t`t because
vo(1 `)+`
1 ` < vo:







Thus, we have shown that an honest equilibrium exists if  > vo, i.e., if ( h
1    vo) > 1,
when sellers can exit for an outside option value vo.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is immediate from the denition of  y that yy() = 1 for
all    y. Hence, we consider  <  y (<  ) below.
It is straightforward to extend the relevant arguments in the proof of Proposition 1,
to verify that yy is continuous and yy() 2 (0;1) for  <  y. To reach a contradiction,































` (~ )   V

` (0) = V
y





and the inequality is from Lemma 6. Furthermore, since
V

` (~ ) = pG(~ ;y













` (~ ) = pG(~ ;y






Gg(~ )) + (1   `)vo

(59)

















Gg(~ ))   vo









` (1)   V 
` (0) =  > vo = V
y
` (1)   vo, there must exist 00 2 (~ ;1) such that
V 
` (00)   V 
` (0)  V
y
` (00)   vo and V 
` ()   V 
` (0) > V
y
` (0)   vo for all  > 00. However,
since pG(00;y(00))  pG(00;yy(00)) and 
Gg(00) > 00, (58) and (59) evaluated at  = 00
imply that V 
` (00) V 
` (0) > V
y
` (00) vo and consequently, V 
` (00) V 
` (0) > V
y
` (00) vo,
contradicting the denition of 00.
Proof of Theorem 3. Recall that 1 and 1 denote the default reputation level and
stationary mass of new sellers, respectively; and v1; yy
v1 and V y
v1 denote `-seller's default
value, strategy and value function, respectively, in equilibrium.
Let (q) denote the probability that a seller of type  draws q 2 fg;bg, i.e., (g) =  =
1   (b). For any k-period quality history hk = (q1; ;qk) 2 Hk := fg;bgk, let (hk)
be the ex-ante probability that hk realizes for a seller of type . We use hk
j = (q1; ;qj)
to denote the rst j-entry truncation of hk.
Given a default reputation 1 > 0, let (hk
j) denote the posterior reputation for a
seller who has survived the history hk
j without cheating, updated according to yy
v1. Setting
(hk















v1(;g) = 0 and yy
v1(;b) = yy
v1() for all . Then, the ex-ante probability that an









j 1);qj))(1   )]: (62)
Consequently, in a stationary state, the measure of nominally k-period old `-sellers











This implies that the total measure of old `-sellers who restart in an arbitrary period is
1(1   1)(v1) where (v1) is as dened earlier in (18).
Now, as veried in the discussion (in the main text) preceding Theorem 3, the value of






is dened in (21). To show that such a xed point exists, we need the next lemma which
we prove later for uninterrupted ow of argument.
Lemma 9 Let   : ( `
1 ; 1
1 ) ! C[0;1] be a mapping such that  (v1) = V y
v1 where C[0;1] is
the set of all continuous functions on [0;1]. Then,   is continuous in v1 under the sup
norm at any v1 > `
1 :
Note that, as v1 ! `
1 , 
y
1(v1) converges to a limit strictly greater than 0. Since the
right derivative of pG(;yy
v1()) with respect to  is uniformly bounded away from 0 at
 = 0, so is the right derivative of V y
v1(). Since V y
v1(0) > `
1  by (16) and V y
v1 is strictly
increasing, therefore, V y
v1(
y
1(v1)) > v1 for v1 suciently close to `
1 . On the other hand,
as v1 ! 1
1 , since i < 1 we have V y
v1(
y
1(v1))  V y
v1(i) < V y
v1(1)  v1 for v1 suciently
close to 1
1  by (16). Then, since 
y
1(v1) is continuous in v1 from (21) and   is continuous
by Lemma 9, we must have V y
v1(
y
1(v1)) = v1 for at least one v1 2 ( `
1 ; 1
1 ).
Let 1 and v1 denote a pair of stationary default reputation level and value, i.e.,
v1 = V y
v1(1) and 1 = 
y
1(v1). Note that to establish a stationary equilibrium, we still
need to show that it is optimal for h-sellers to always report truthfully as long as   1.
Since the continuation value of h-seller after cheating is the equilibrium value of the default
level 1, V
y
h(1), rather than V
y
h(0), the optimality condition of h-seller is more dicult
to verify than when restarting is impossible. In fact, it has not been proved that for all
stationary pairs of 1 and v1, truthful announcement for all   1 is optimal for h-sellers
when `-sellers announce according to yy
v1() for   1.
However, the proof of [S] included in the proof of Theorem 1 relies on V 
` (0) being a
constant, rather than V 
` (0) = `
1  and consequently, applies analogously to V
y
h() dened
as per (45) with y replaced by yy
v1 for  > 1. As a result, if h > 1+
p
1+4`2+4`3
2+2` , it constitutes
an equilibrium for `-sellers to announce according to yy
v1() and h-sellers honestly for





h(1))  1.25 It may be worth mentioning that this is a sucient
condition, so stationary equilibria in which h-sellers behave honestly may exist in a wider
class of environments.
Finally we prove Lemma 9. Since continuity under the sup norm requires uniform
convergence, the possibility of a xed point having unbounded derivative poses a potential
problem. The bulk of the proof evolves around how to circumvent this problem. We start
with two preliminary lemmas asserting that p
G() is of bounded variation on [";1] for any
" > 0 (Lemma A1) and consequently, so is the xed point V y
v1 (Lemma A2).
Lemma A1 For any " > 0 there exists M" > 0 such that 8v1 2 [ `
1 ; 1
1 ); 8V 2








Proof. Note from (1) that we can nd k > 0 such that
@pG
@ > 0 is bounded above uniformly
by k; and
@pG











0  < k because pG decreases in y,
proving (63).








(1   h)(1   `)(1   y)





(1   h)(1   `)(1   )
[(1   h) + (1   )(1   `)(1   y)]
2 > ~ k"














V()) < k" (
























































25The proof is omitted because it is the same as the proof of [S] with obvious changes, such as v1 and
 y in place of V 
` (0) and  , respectively.
















if  > "; (64)
where V y
v1 is the xed point of the operator Tv1.
Proof. For given v1 there exists  > 0 dened by V y
v1(












Gg()) + (1   `)v1

if   :
(65)
To reach a contradiction, suppose that for any K > 0 one can nd 1 > " such that
D+V y
v1(1) > K. Then, since 





`, (63) and (65)
would imply that 1 >  when K is suciently large and that one can construct a sequence
n ! 1 where n = 
Gg(n 1). Since there is  < 1 such that 
Gg() >  y for any  > ",
by choosing K arbitrarily large, one can ensure that D+V y
v1(
Gg()) is arbitrarily large.
But, this is impossible because D+V y


















a formula adapted from (??) for V y
v1() for  >  y. Hence, we conclude that D+V y
v1() is




























for  > ". Thus, D+V y
v1()  M"
1 h if  > ".
Next, choose v1 2 ( `
1 ; 1
1 ). Notice that for a suciently small  > 0; in particular
smaller than v1   `
1 , the operator Tv1 can be extended to F
v1 \ C[0;1] where F
v1 :=
[v1 vv1+Fv. As an intermediate step, we need





v1 \ C[0;1] ! C[0;1] is continuous in sup norm. (67)
Proof. Consider V;V 0 2 F





V 0() are, by construction, the solutions to
min
0y1
 pG(;y)   
 
maxfv1;V (Bb(;y))g   v1
  (68)









0)()   Tv1(V )()j <  + ;
41which establishes (67).
Given v1 2 ( `
1 ; 1




v1+ \ C[0;1]. By (68), the value of pG(;y
y
V()) diers when calculated for Tv1
and when calculated for Tv1+, and the dierence is at most . Thus, from (56),
Tv1(V )()   2jj  Tv1+(V )()  Tv1(V )() + 2jj 8 2 [0;1]: (69)
In particular, observe that
Tv1(V
y







Finally, to prove continuity of   at v1, we decompose the argument into two parts:
First, we prove uniform convergence of functions  (v1 + ) = V
y
v1+ to  (v1) = V y
v1 as
 ! 0 on intervals [";1], then do the same separately on [0;2"]. The continuity will be
established by combining the two parts.
We know from Lemma A2 that on the interval [";1]; the function V
y
v1+ is K"-Liptchitz
where K" = M"
1 h: Then from Ascoli-Arzel a Theorem (see Royden (1988)), the subset
consisting of all K"-Lipschitz function of F
v1 is compact under the sup norm. Hence, there
exists a sequence of xed points V
y
v1+ such that, when restricted to the domain [";1], it
converges as  ! 0 to a limit, denoted by W
[";1]
v1 , where W
[";1]












v1+ restricted on [";1] and let e V
y[";1]
v1+ denote the continuous linear
extension of V
y[";1]













Note that Tv1(lim!0 e V
y[";1]
v1+)() for each  is fully determined by lim!0 e V
y[";1]
v1+ restricted
on [;1] according to (56), and the same is true for Tv1+(e V
y[";1]





[";1] by denition, therefore, (70) and (71) imply that
Tv1(f W
[";1]
v1 )()  f W
[";1]
v1 ()  Tv1(f W
[";1]
v1 )() for all  2 [";1];
where f W
[";1]
v1 is the continuous linear extension of W
[";1]
v1 on [0;"]. Since " > 0 is arbitrary
and V y
v1 is the only function V that satises Tv1(V )() = V () on [";1] for all " 2 (0;1)
by uniqueness of the xed point of Tv1, it further follows that f W
[";1]
v1 = V y
v1 on [";1], i.e.,
W
[";1]
v1 coincides with V y







v1 under the sup norm on [";1] for any " > 0: (72)
Note, however, that this is not sucient for uniform convergence on [0;1]. Hence,
choose   > 0 such that V y
v1(
Gg( )) < v1: Then, because V
y
v1+ converges to V y
v1 under
the sup norm on [
 
2;1] by (72), we have V
y
v1+(
Gg( )) < v1 +  for suciently small
42. But this implies that V
y
v1+(
Gg()) < v1 +  for all     for suciently small ,
and consequently, V
y
v1+() = pG(;1) + (v1 + ) on [0;  ], which converges uniformly to
V y





v1 under the sup norm on [0;  ]. Combining this
with (72) when " =  =2, we obtain uniform convergence under the sup norm on the entire
domain [0;1], which proves continuity of   at v1 and thus, Lemma 9. This completes the
proof of Theorem 3.
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